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INTRODUCTION 
In the midst of the first Intifada (1987-1993), the Israeli authorities imposed new regulations 
in order to control and filter Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gazaand attempting to 
enter Israel and EastJerusalem. These regulations aimed first at preventing individuals and 
groups from committing attacks on Israeli soil (Hass 2001). Second, they were used to limit 
the access of Palestinians to the Israeli labor market, and thus reduce the dependency of the 
Israeli economy on Palestinian manpower (Kemp 2004). The permit system was later 
integrated into a more systematic policy aiming at separating the Israeli and Palestinian 
populations (Hass 2002). 
Moreover, this system has generated complex formal and informal networks of intermediaries 
on which Palestinians became increasingly dependent for their mobility across the Israeli-
Palestinian divide. Indeed, this control mechanism produces a double individualization of the 
subject. This individualization of control occurs, first, by defining the capacity of a 
Palestinian to obtain a permit according to a political and bio-social profiling, and second, by 
imposing on each Palestinian the sponsorship of an Israeli citizen. This condition makes the 
allocation of a permit dependent on his/her network of relationships. 
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This study has two main objectives.First, by focusing on the chains of relations and 
interactions that develop through the process of permit allocation,I intend to identify the 
multiple actors that, within andoutside of the State of Israel, are directly taking part into the 
allocation of permits. This will allow me to better stress the heterogeneity of this control 
regime as well as its informal dimensions. Second, I wish to stress how the constitution of 
these formal and informal networks deeply affects the ways Palestinians relate to space and 
the location of borders in Israel-Palestine. I contend that the emergence of formal and 
informal networks around the allocation of movement permits fosters the duplicating of 
borders from the actual Israeli and Palestinians territories to reticular spaces. 
My talk will be divided into three parts. In the first part, I will show thatthe mobility of 
Palestiniansisnot merely dependent on their varying statuses, as defined by the Israeli 
biosocial profiling system but also on the location of a given individual within a specific 
network of relations. In the second part, I shall demonstrate that this system fosters the co-
opting of formal and informal intermediaries on whom Palestinian permit applicants are 
highly dependent. Finally, I will show how this cooptation system contributes to the 
readjustment of the functioning of the whole Israeli permit system. 
I- MOBILITY: A MATTER OF STATUS OR NETWORK?  
The literature dealing with the issue of the permit systemin Israel-Palestine has mainly 
approached Palestinians‟ access to mobility as being determined strictly by their political 
profile and bio-social profile (age, status, occupation) (see for instance Abu Zahra 2007, 
Hanieh 2006; Kelly 2006). As a matter of fact,Israeli authorities define the restrictions 
imposed on Palestinian workers and individuals on the basis of age, occupation, marital 
status, as well as hispolitical affiliation.Yet, I‟d like to show that this approach is too 
reductive, as it relies too much on the discourse of the Israeli authorities. In practice security 
and bio-social profiles are less significantthan an individual‟sbelonging to a network and 
his/her location within it. 
Three elements call into question the significance of security and bio-social profiling. First of 
all, bio-social profiles are often unclear. They have changed constantly since the beginning of 
the 1990s. While at the beginning of the 2000s only male workers older than 30 could apply 
for permits, this age limit was raised and later lowered again (Ekstein 2011, B‟tselem 2007). 
Moreover, there is a certain level of arbitrariness in the way these permits are allocated. A 
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person fitting the official criteria and having no security record can be refused a work permit 
inside Israel without knowing the reasons, while a person not fitting these criteria could be 
allocated a permit (Handel 2009). In other words, it is hard for Palestinians as well as for 
observers to make sense of the precise definition of these profiles.  
Second, regardless of his/her bio-social profile, a person wishing to obtain a 
permitsystematically needs to be sponsored by an Israeli citizen or a foreign body accredited 
by the Israeli authorities. For instance, a Palestinian worker desiringto work in Israel will turn 
to his Israeli employer to get a permit. The employer will then apply to the Israeli Work office 
by providing the precise details of his Palestinian worker (ID number, name, etc.). The 
application will then be transmitted by the Work office to the Israeli General Security 
Services (GSS). If the lattervalidate it, they will allow the Work Office to issue a work permit 
to the Israeli entrepreneur and the Palestinian worker. Many other sponsors can also be 
summoned. According to one‟s occupation and activity within Israel he or she could contact 
clergy members belonging to different churches in Jerusalem; members ofdiplomatic 
representations, NGO, etc.  
In practice, networks are more influential than status. Anunfitting security and bio-social 
profile of a Palestinian is often overlooked by the authorities if thePalestinian applicant or his 
sponsoris willing to cooperate with a person linked to the GSS. Moreover, Israeli authorities 
have long ago accepted certain modes of circumventing the length of the procedures. Israeli 
civil servants, Member of the Knesset Israeli Parliament, or lawyerscan accelerate the 
procedure of application and delivery of a work permit to a Palestinian that enjoys their direct 
or indirect support. 
Both formally and in practice the procedure of permit application makes Palestinians closely 
dependent on their sponsors on the Israeli side. It is the intervention of these same sponsors 
that can validate or eludetheir profile and thusprovide them with an access to mobility.  
II- THE PERMIT SYSTEM AND THE COOPTATION OF INTERMEDIARIES 
The sponsorship imposed on Palestinian permit applicants and the modes of bureaucratic 
circumvention introduced by the Israeli authorities have contributed to the establishment of 
patron/client relations between the State authorities, intermediaries and permit applicants. 
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Existing literature has discussed these patron/client relations between the Israeli authorities 
and the Palestinian population (see for instance Azulay and Ophir 2008). They have 
underscored the fact that this system of dependence has been used extensively as a tool of 
control either to maintain Palestinian dependency on Israel anddeter resistance, or to recruit 
an extensive network of collaborators. Yet, the other implications of the emergence of such 
chains of intermediaries between Palestinians and the Israeli authorities have been 
overlooked. 
This sponsorship system has also contributed to the cooptation of formal sponsors as 
„regulating authorities‟. They are held responsible for the behavior of the Palestinians they 
sponsor. They are also in a position to select a certain person at the expense of another. They 
can facilitate and accelerate the procedure, the length of the permit, the time it covers during a 
day, as well as the territory it may cover within Israel. This regulating role is not merely 
symbolic sincesponsors are the actors who are first addressed by Palestinians. It is not the 
Israeli Authorities that a Palestinian will practically approach to apply, but rather these 
sponsors, who will in turn transmit the application to the relevant administration. 
Furthermore, this system of sponsorship has contributed to the co-opting of informal 
intermediaries whose number has increased between the 1990s and 2000s as a result of the 
degradation of the politicalsituation between Israelis and Palestinians. Since the outburst of 
the second Intifada, more intermediaries have been needed to ensure contacts between 
Palestinians workers and their Israeli employers.  
In 2000 Israelis citizens wereformally forbidden by Israeli authorities to enter Palestinian 
autonomous areas in the West Bank and Gaza (see map on ppt.). Moreover, given the rising 
number of attacks many Israeli employers dread to enterthe occupied territories.Consequently, 
in order to recruit workers and to ensure their transportation to the working site Israeli 
employershave been compelled to rely on new intermediaries who can be eitherPalestinians 
holding Israeli citizenship or Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories. These go-
betweens have helped to recruit the workers as well as to ensure theircoaching on Israeli 
working sites. 
Moreover, informal go-betweens have been appointed by the Israeli authorities.Since the 
outburst of the second Intifada (2000) and the rupture of the security cooperation in 2002, the 
Israeli Coordination office in the Occupied Territory has ceased to work with the Palestinian 
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Coordination office. Between 1994and 2000Palestiniansneeding a permit could pass through 
the mediation of the Palestinian coordination office whowould transfer their application to the 
Israeli coordination office. Since the outbreak of the second Intifada, the Israeli coordination 
office has allowed parallel channels and bodies within the Palestinian National Authority, 
such as municipalities, ministry civil servants, governorates, chambers of commerce, etc.,to 
transfer permits applications 
Finally, the complexity and the lack of transparency of the issuing procedure of permits 
fostered the intervention of „bridge-persons‟ (literally, persons that make profit out of playing 
a role of go-between).For example: Palestinian attorneysare often involved in order to clarify 
the reasons why an applicant is systematically refused a permit, or simply to accelerate the 
delivery. Given the tightening of movement restrictions and the lack of mobility of 
Palestinians these attorneys have been increasingly compelled to rely on Israeli attorneys. 
Sometimes, Palestinians prefer to contact directly Israeli lawyers. Beside lawyers, many other 
people tend to intervene: from individuals trying to sell crucial information or contacts, to 
people that facilitate the waiting in lines at Israeli offices or check points…. 
 
III- MEDIATION AND THE INFORMAL ECONOMY 
In other words, beyond the co-opting of an increasing number of formal and informal 
intermediaries into the functioning of the mobility regime, the system of sponsorship opens up 
new opportunities for a series of actors that have re-appropriated this permit regime to 
increase their power and profit. 
As in many other instances in the world, the dependency of workers toward their sponsors 
opens the way to new articulations of power relations andpossibilities for exploitation. The 
way Israeli entrepreneurshave profited of this dependency of Palestinian workers within Israel 
proper and inside the Israeli settlements has been extensively documented and even 
denounced by both the academic literature and NGOs involved in the defense of human 
rights. But this impact should be studied further at other levels. For instance, little research 
has been conducted about the way this dependency has also affected power relations between 
churches, diplomatic agencies, NGOs and the Palestinian workers or staff they all recruit.  
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From an economic point of view some Israeli and Palestinian entrepreneurs have set up very 
profitable activities around the informal trafficking of real permits. Israeli entrepreneurs often 
apply for more permits than the number they actually need. They resort to such a strategy in 
order to counter the potential refusal of the Israeli authorities to allocate permits to a certain 
number of persons. The underlying logic is that it is better to ask for more than to have an 
insufficient number of workers on site. If an employerhas a surplus of permits, he can always 
use the additional ones to help former of future employees.  
Yet, other employers have deployed another strategy in order to maximize their profits. 
Instead of applying for the 100 permits he needsan entrepreneur will apply for 200 for a 
period of 6 months to the Israeli Work Office. Once obtained, the additional permits will be 
sold at a higher price to Palestinian workers. In 2010, a permit which actually cost 1200 NIS 
(240€) to an entrepreneur per month could be sold up to 1800NIS (360€).The sale of 100 six-
month-permits would thus represent a profit amounting to 360 000NIS (72 000€)! The 
Palestinian workers who would benefit from this sponsoring would be able to cross 
checkpoints “legally” and evolve in Israel more or less freely.Yet, they would have to find a 
job by themselves… “illegally”. 
Such a trade cannot occur without a complex and wide chain of informal 
intermediaries,sincepermits are only issued by the Israeli Authorities and applications need to 
refer to the exact details of the Palestinian worker (ID card number, magnet number, etc.)and 
involve workers that are not supposed to be rejected by the General Security Services.So, an 
Israeli entrepreneur involved in such an informal-formal trade needs to rely, on the Palestinian 
side, on a contact or a chain of contacts which he can trustenough in order to obtain such 
information and broaden the spectrum of his clients. Moreover, pursued on a large scale, as 
some have done, such a trade needs to involve consultants (accountants, lawyers, etc.) who 
could help to set up the business by issuing fake orders, contracts and bills, as well as 
byjustifying the profit generated by such an activity to the Israeli tax office. Some networks 
have actuallyinvolved high-ranking Israeli civil servants within the Israeli Ministry of Interior 
and the Civil Administration, to the point that they have been able, in certain years,to exceed 
the quotas of permits! 
The development of these activities is such that there is indeed a parallel network of permit 
allocation between Israel and the Occupied Territory. In the southern West Bank people 
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would tell me that there are four main ways to obtain a permit: the official channel through an 
Israeli entrepreneur; a real permitobtained through a fake sponsorship (more expensive); a 
permit obtained through a Palestinian collaborating with the Israeli GSS; and a fake permit 
obtained through a falsifier. 
Needless to say that the wealth and the power that can be obtained through thesenetworks 
push the people who master them to regulate the entry of outsiders.As a matter of fact, not 
everybody can access these networks of facilitators or of permit traffickers. The rules and 
limitations filtering the entryof people intosuch networks contribute to the building of new 
obstacles to movement.Since these obstacles affect levels of connections and interactions they 
cannot be defined as borders. Nevertheless, they render territorial or topographical borders 
more impermeable as, in order to obtain a permit that allows one to cross the territorial limits 
imposed by Israel, Palestinians first have to circumvent or pass through topological obstacles 
within these networks. 
CONCLUSION 
The study of the Israeli permit system,as seen from the point of viewof the formal and 
informal networks it generates,allows us a unique perspective on its functioning. First, going 
beyond the institutional definition of this control mechanism helps identifying the many 
actors that participate in it. These includeIsraelis and Palestinians actors, State and non State 
actors, local and internationals, formal and informal actors. Moreover, the network approach 
allows a better understanding of the economy of relations deployed within this power 
mechanism. It shows the way the Israeli State delegates its control toformal and informal 
intermediaries that have become, at different scales, new “regulating authorities” of 
Palestinian movement. It also highlights how this mechanism is diverted, by different actors, 
to achieveeconomic and political goals and the way their daily participation affects in turn the 
functioning of the whole mechanism of surveillance. 
Furthermore, a network approachalso helps us to better apprehend how the individualization 
of control duplicatesor extends borders within reticular spaces. Since it favors the emergence 
of networks, within which connections are regulated, exchangedagainst specific payment, the 
permit regime has duplicated borders by creating new topological limits: each connection 
becomes a potential obstacle. These informal limits are not mere metaphors; they are very real 
and substantialfor Palestinians who need to obtain a permit. They come first, i.e. it is only 
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after having crossed these limits, that Palestinian can have a chance to cross territorial 
borders. 
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